Different streams of research offer seemingly conflicting predictions as to the effects of analyzing reasons for preferences on the attitude-behavior link. Our paper applies these different theoretical accounts to a new product scenario and identifies conditions under which analyzing reasons for brand preferences can increase or decrease the predictive value of reported preferences. Consistent with dual process theories of persuasion, Study 1 finds that reasons analysis increases the link between attitude and behavior, when the measure of behavior closely follows attitude measurement. By contrast, and consistent with research by
reasons analysis increases the link between attitude and behavior, when the measure of behavior closely follows attitude measurement. By contrast, and consistent with research by
Wilson and his colleagues on the disruptive effects of reasons analysis, we find that thinking about reasons significantly decreases the attitude-behavior correlation when the observed behavior occurs after a substantial delay. A second study not only replicates this finding, but also suggests that the timing of the reasons task can be an important moderator of the disruption effect. Specifically, we draw on the literature on accountability effects to show that even when there is a delay between attitude and behavior, reasons analysis actually leads to an increase in the attitude-behavior link, as long as reasons are analyzed after attitude measurement. Finally, a third study helps to validate our account of the effects of reasons analysis by obtaining parallel findings for attitude persistence. Together, our studies enable us to offer preliminary advice to both practitioners and academics regarding the potential effects of asking consumers to think about why they like or dislike certain products. Our findings also suggest that seemingly opposing theoretical perspectives on reasons analysis are not so much conflicting as complementary: either reinforcement or disruption may be obtained depending on the levels of moderating factors such as the timing of the behavior measure and the timing of reasons analysis.
A recent stream of research has focused on "mere-measurement" effects -wherein the process of measurement itself has been shown to change consumers' attitudes, intentions and behavior (Morwitz, Johnson and Schmittlein, 1993; Raghubir and Menon 1996; Simmons, Bickart, and Lynch 1993) . For example, researchers have shown that merely asking consumers whether they intended to purchase an automobile or a personal computer in a survey increased their likelihood of actual purchase (Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996; Morwitz et al. 1993) . Research in this area is based on the emerging perspective that attitudes, intentions and behavior may not always be retrieved directly from memory, but may be constructed on demand, depending on the information that comes to mind at any point of time (Morwitz et al. 1993; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988) .
The current research examines the effect of asking consumers to analyze the reasons for their preferences. Such reasons-analysis may occur as a result of survey questions, behavioral predictions (Hoch 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischoff 1980) , or even when prompted by certain types of advertising. For example, some advertisements encourage consumers to think of the reasons why they would prefer a particular brand (Pechmann and Estaban 1994) . In this article, we study whether such reasons-analysis affects consumer purchase behavior. In particular, we examine the effect that the act of analyzing reasons has on the link between brand attitudes and subsequent behavior.
Several streams of research suggest that thinking about one's attitudes should increase the strength of this link. For instance, research based on dual process models of persuasion (Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) indicates that greater cognitive processing of attitude-relevant information increases the accessibility of this information, as well as of the attitude itself, thus increasing the possibility that these attitudes will guide behavior (see also Fazio, Powell and Williams 1989) . Another stream of research based on the effects of accountability (Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Tetlock 1992) suggests that justifying one's attitudes increases the evaluative consistency of underlying cognitions, thus bolstering the attitude. Such attitude bolstering should also be manifested in a better link between attitudes and subsequent behavior (Tesser, Martin and Mendolia 1995) .
These related areas of research all suggest that reasons-analysis should increase the strength of the link between attitudes and behavior. However, research by Wilson and his colleagues on the disruption effect (see Wilson et al. 1989a for a review) has repeatedly documented that reasons-analysis can actually result in a breakdown of the link between attitude and behavior. Using attitude objects as diverse as puzzles, paintings and dating relationships, this research stream has found that when people are asked to think about the reasons for their preferences, they display a significantly lower attitude-behavior link compared to people who are not asked to think about reasons (Wilson et al. 1989a; Wilson, Kraft and Dunn 1989; Wilson et al. 1984) .
The major goal of the current paper is to bring these different streams of research together in order to examine the effects of analyzing reasons for brand preferences in a new product context. In particular, we seek to identify when such reasons analysis will produce a disruptive effect, and when it will have a reinforcing effect, in terms of weakening or strengthening the attitude-behavior link (as well as any related effect on attitude persistence).
Our results carry clear practical implications, as both advertisers and market researchers will be interested in knowing whether and when asking consumers to think about the reasons for their preferences will increase or decrease the possibility of brand purchase. From a conceptual standpoint, our findings enable us to link together various theoretical models that make somewhat conflicting predictions as to the effects of reasons analysis. Because of our specific focus on the effects of reasons analysis, and also because of a relative lack of attention in the consumer literature, we begin by briefly reviewing research relating to the disruption effect.
THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF ANALYZING REASONS
Wilson and his colleagues have reliably demonstrated that analyzing reasons can reduce the predictive power of attitudes. In a typical experiment, Wilson et al. (1984) asked a group of student participants to evaluate a set of puzzles in terms of how interesting/boring they found each puzzle. Participants in the "reasons" condition were told to think about the reasons for their preferences as they played with the puzzles, while participants in the control condition were not given such instructions. After playing with the puzzles for a total of five minutes, reasons participants were asked to write down the reasons for their attitudes towards each puzzle, while control participants were asked questions about their academic background. Attitudes towards the puzzles were measured for all participants. As a measure of behavior, all participants were then given a free play period, lasting fifteen minutes, in which they could choose which puzzle they wanted to play with and for how long (participants could also choose not to play with any puzzle). It was found that participants in the reasons condition (as compared to control participants) exhibited a significantly lower correlation between their attitudes towards the various puzzles and their behavior towards them, as manifested by the amount of time they chose to play with each puzzle in the free play period.
Wilson and his colleagues have proposed a broad based mechanism for the disruption effect. According to this mechanism, disruption is likely to occur when people are not fully aware of the reasons for their preferences, such as when people lack knowledge about the attitude object (Wilson, Kraft and Dunn 1989) , or when attitudes are based primarily on affect (Wilson et al. 1989a ). Under these circumstances, when asked to report reasons for preferences, people tend to focus disproportionately on cues that are easily verbalizable, to the relative neglect of cues that are not easy to verbalize (Wilson et. al 1993; Wilson et al. 1989a ). For example, as discussed by Wilson et al. (1993) , people may have a positive reaction to a good painting but may not be able to say why they like the painting. When forced to think of reasons, instead of trying to access the complex mixture of thoughts and emotions aroused by the painting, they may focus on some easily verbalizable cue, e.g., "I find the subject matter boring." 1 Further, once such reasons are made salient, people tend to change their attitudes in the direction of the articulated reasons via a process of self-attribution (Bem 1972) . Thus, the attitudes reported by people who analyze reasons for preferences tend to be biased by a subset of the total set of cues that would otherwise have guided their attitudes.
However, actual behavior may not be guided by this biased set of cues. Specifically, in the experimental paradigm used by Wilson and his colleagues, behavior is typically measured on the basis of continuous interaction with the attitude object (e.g., playing with puzzles for some time; keeping a painting in your possession for a few days, etc.). As a result of this continuous interaction, the cues that had been made temporarily salient by the reasons manipulation decrease in influence, while "true" evaluations tend to reassert themselves (Wilson et al. 1993 ).
Thus, behavior is guided by such chronic or default evaluations, which are based on reactions to the overall features of the object, whereas reported attitudes are based on a biased subset of cues. Such a mismatch between the bases of attitude and behavior is the crucial factor leading to the disruption of the attitude-behavior link. Support for this mismatch perspective was also obtained by Millar and Tesser (1986b) , who found that reasons analysis -which in their experimental context caused attitudes to be based on cognitive cues -only caused disruption when behavior was manipulated to rely on affective cues, thus creating a mismatch. In sum, prior research on the disruption effect suggests that the attitude-behavior link is likely to be weakened when analyzing reasons causes the reported attitudes to be based on a different set of cues than the ones that guide eventual behavior.
THE DISRUPTION EFFECT IN A PURCHASE CONTEXT
The consumer purchase context provides an interesting domain in which to observe the effects of reasons analysis, inasmuch as it facilitates the occurrence of such a mismatch between attitudes and behavior, particularly in the case of low involvement packaged goods. At the time of initial exposure to brand information (e.g. through advertising), the consumer is typically exposed to a mixture of both verbalizable cues (e.g., information on product attributes) as well as cues that are relatively harder to verbalize (e.g., visual cues such as packaging). An initial attitude towards the product is likely to be based on this overall set of cues. However, at the time of choice, the cues that were salient at the time of attitude formation may no longer all be present or accessible. Instead, behavior is often guided by the (primarily visual) cues available in the purchase context, such as packaging. In such a situation, we propose that analyzing reasons for initial preferences leads a to disruption of the attitude-behavior link.
Consider, for example, a consumer receiving initial information about a new brand of candy. This information might consist of several different types of cues, such as a picture of the candy package, as well as information regarding product attributes, such as the availability and shelf life of the candy bar, etc. Given that candy is typically a low involvement, experience good for most consumers, and further, that the brand is unfamiliar to the consumer, it is unlikely that consumers will be aware of the reasons for their preferences (Wilson et al. 1989b ). In such a situation, consumers who are asked to analyze reasons for their preferences will tend to focus disproportionately on cues that are easily verbalized, such as the product attribute information. In contrast, visual cues such as the package picture might be relatively neglected, since visual information is typically harder to verbalize (Wilson and Kraft 1988; Wilson et al. 1993) . Thus,
while consumers who do not analyze reasons are likely to incorporate both types of cues in their attitudes, the initial attitudes of consumers engaging in the reasons task are likely to be heavily guided by the verbalizable cues. At the time of purchase, however, the cues that were present at the time of attitude formation will no longer all be available for use. In particular, easily verbalizable elements (such as attribute information) may no longer be an input in the decision.
Instead, for a low involvement product such as candy, the purchase decision is likely to be largely influenced by non-verbalizable cues such as packaging which are available at the point of purchase. Accordingly, there will be a greater match between the cues guiding attitudes and those guiding behavior for people who did not analyze reasons, as compared to those who did.
Consequently, analyzing reasons for brand preferences should lead to a disruption between brand attitudes and choice behavior.
DISRUPTION VS. REINFORCEMENT I: TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF ATTITUDE MEASUREMENT AND BEHAVIOR
In the marketing scenario outlined above, we suggest that disruption should occur because the underlying basis for attitudes in the reasons condition will be different from the cues guiding the purchase decision. However, for this effect to occur, there should be a separation in time between the attitude measure and the behavior measure, so that the cues underlying the reported attitude are no longer salient at the time of behavior. If the behavior measure closely follows the attitude measure, the cues underlying initial attitudes should also exert a strong influence on behavior, for the "reasons" participants as well as the control participants, thereby preventing disruption.
Not only should disruption not be observed when attitude and behavior measures are proximal, but various streams of research suggest that analyzing reasons in such a context should actually increase the strength of the link. According to dual process models of persuasion (Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) , heightened cognitive processing of message information leads to a strengthening of the link between the attitudes induced by the message and subsequent behavior (Petty et al. 1983) . Although several factors may be responsible for this effect, it has been suggested that greater cognitive elaboration leads to multiple accessing and rehearsal of the attitude schema, increasing the accessibility of the attitude as well as the cues underlying the attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Zanna, Fazio and Ross 1994) . In turn, greater accessibility produces a stronger link between attitude and behavior (Berger and Mitchell 1989; Fazio, Powell and Williams 1989) .
While the reasons analysis task is not equivalent in all respects to the type of systematic message elaboration identified by dual process models of persuasion, it is reasonable to suppose that analyzing reasons for their evaluations can lead participants to engage in multiple rehearsal and accessing of their attitudes, as well as the underlying brand information. As Fazio (1995, p. 252) suggests, any manipulation that "calls one's attention to the associated evaluation will serve as an additional trial of associative learning and strengthen the association." To the extent, therefore, that reasons-analysis serves to "call attention to the associated evaluation," this task should lead to increased accessibility of attitudes and underlying cognitions, and a concomitant increase in the attitude-behavior link.
Over time, however, neither the initial brand attitudes, nor the cues they were based on, will be as accessible as they were at the time of exposure. Thus, if a sufficient interval elapses between initial exposure and the actual purchase decision, people will tend to construct their decisions anew (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Schwarz and Bless, 1992; Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988 should lead to a reinforcement of the link between brand attitudes and purchase behavior when there is no time lag between the attitude and behavior measures.
STUDY 1
Student participants at a US university formed attitudes towards four unfamiliar brands of Canadian candy bars based both on a visual cue (i.e., the product package), as well as more verbal information comprising: a) an advertising slogan and some information on the brand's history; and b) information on two attributes: shelf life of the candy bar, and its availability in Canadian stores. Brand choice was used as the measure of behavior.
A pretest was carried out to check that the packaging cue was relatively hard to verbalize, and also to ensure that the items of verbalizable information were not seen as being very highly diagnostic (cf. Wilson et al. 1989a) . 118 participants viewed the complete set of information about each candy bar. They were then told that we would like to find out how easy it would be for them to verbally describe the positives and negatives of some of the different candy-related features they were given information about. They responded on a 1-7 scale anchored by "Would be difficult (or easy) to verbalize exactly why you liked or disliked this feature." As expected, the packaging cue was perceived as being the least easy to verbalize. Average ratings were as follows: shelf life=4.6, availability of product=4.8, information about company's marketing approach (e.g., "brand is offered in a wide range of products")= 4.1, packaging=2.4, and advertising slogan=4.1 (higher numbers refer to greater ease of verbalizing).
In the same pretest, participants also rated each of the different pieces of information in terms of how important they were in making a candy purchase decision, on a 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important) scale. The means were: shelf life=3.2, availability=5.0, the company's marketing approach=2.8, packaging=4.8, and advertising slogan=3.7. As can be seen, none of the items of information were perceived to be significantly more diagnostic than the packaging cue. This is important, since it has been pointed out that disruption may not result if the initial verbalizable information is extremely diagnostic (Wilson et al. 1989a) . For example, the advertised brand of candy might be advertised as have significantly better taste than others available on the market. In such a case, it is likely that consumers in both "reasons" and "nonreasons" conditions would focus primarily on the diagnostic taste information while forming preferences. Since consumers would thus be aware of (and able to verbalize) the true reasons for their preferences, analyzing reasons would not lead to any change in the basis of attitudes, thereby preventing disruption in the reasons vs. non-reasons condition. Accordingly we restrict our attention to cases where the verbalizable information is not significantly more diagnostic than the package cue. This issue is discussed in greater detail subsequently.
Method
A 2 (the presence or absence of a product-related reasons task) X 2 (delay/no delay between attitude measurement and actual behavior) between-subjects full factorial design was used. 209 graduate management students participated in the study during a regular class session in return for an entry in one of five $100 lotteries. They also received a free product sample (a candy bar) but were not aware of this reward until the experiment was complete.
Participants were presented with a short booklet and asked to read the instruction page. The cover story for the experiment was that professors in the marketing department were conducting the study in partnership with The Confectionery Manufacturers Association of Canada (a fictional organization), who were interested in the preferences of US consumers.
After this initial instruction page, participants read that they would be provided with information about four real brands of Canadian candy bars which were not available on the U.S.
market at the time of the experiment: Crunchie, Caramilk, Mr. Big and Sweet Marie. Pretesting demonstrated very low levels of familiarity with each of the brand names -each had a mean familiarity rating below 1.5 on a 7 point scale with endpoints 1 = "not at all familiar" and 7 = "extremely familiar." Participants were told that the information would include (i) the advertising slogan and some information on the brand's history, (ii) a reproduction of the candy bar packaging and (iii) information on the candy bar's shelf life and availability in Canadian stores.
Finally, participants were asked to examine all the presented information carefully as they would be asked for their evaluations of the different candy bars.
At this stage of the experiment participants were instructed to begin examining the alternative descriptions and attribute information. The next four pages of the booklet contained a)
an advertising slogan for each of the candy bars (e.g., "Crunchie… the crispiest, crunchiest candy bar in town"), b) a brief two-paragraph history of each of the brands (as discussed above, this history for each brand was pretested to be relatively positive but non-diagnostic in content, e.g., "In 1985-86 the brand needed a new strategy, and the idea was quite simple: make Mr. Big BIG! In 1987, the bar was upsized, the pack was flashed with "now gigantic" and the catchy line, "When you're this big, they call you Mister" was used"), and c) a small table for each of the brands which contained information on shelf life (number of days, ranging from 90-120) and the availability of the candy bar in Canadian stores (ranging from "limited availability" to "widely available"). As a visual cue, a large computer projection (8'X8') of all four candy bar packages was displayed at the front of the room. The projection was kept up throughout the session in order to aid participants in distinguishing between the different brands of candy while completing the questionnaire tasks and measures.
To this point, there were no differences across the four experimental conditions.
Participants who were assigned to a product-related reasons condition (a "reasons" condition)
were now asked to give reasons for liking or disliking each of the four candy bars. 2 The initial instructions were as follows:
In order to aid you in making your evaluations of the candy bars, please write your brief reasons for liking/disliking each candy bar on the following pages. Please do not take more than one minute for each candy bar.
Note: The reasons you list will be kept totally anonymous, and will not be used as research data. This reason-listing task has been given solely in order to help you arrive at your evaluations. Prior research has shown that completing this task is very helpful in order to organize your thoughts. Your responses to all these questions will be kept totally anonymous.
Participants who were assigned to a product-unrelated reasons condition (a "control" condition) they were asked to give reasons related to their choice of schools, majors, etc.: measurement and behavior (the "immediate" condition), they were then informed that while the experiment itself was over, the sponsors of the research had provided promotional samples of the four brands of candy bars. Participants were asked to indicate which of the four they would like to receive by tearing off the appropriate coupon from a set of four coupons (one for each bar) embedded in the booklet. The selected coupon could later be exchanged for a product sample.
Participants did not realize they would receive a product sample until this point in the experiment.
Finally, demographic information was collected and participants were thanked.
If participants had been assigned to a condition with a time lag between attitude measurement and behavior (a "delay" condition), they completed demographic questions after reporting their attitudes toward each of the brands, and were thanked for their participation. Five days later, 4 during their next regularly scheduled class, the experimenters entered the classroom, and informed participants that the sponsors of the research had provided promotional samples of the candy bars (as in the "immediate" condition this was the first time they learned of a product choice). Participants then completed the choice task described for the "immediate" conditions.
The same images of the candy bar wrappers which participants in the "immediate" conditions were exposed to when completing this task, were displayed for the "delay" condition participants.
The timing of the experiment was such that all participants across both delay and immediate conditions completed the choice measure on the same day (i.e., "immediate" participants completed the entire experiment on the second day of the experiment for the "delay" condition participants). Participants in the immediate condition were in different rooms from those in the delay condition.
Results
There were no significant effects on initial brand attitudes
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. The critical dependent variable in our study, however, is not attitude itself, but the link between attitude and behavior.
Accordingly, a measure of attitude-behavior consistency was constructed by computing the Pearson product-moment correlation between the attitude ratings reported by participants for all of the new brands evaluated with a binary measure of choice (participants either chose the evaluated brand or they did not; thus four attitude-behavior observations were obtained from each participant, one for each of the four brands). Following Berger (1992) , an attitude-behavior correlation in each condition was then computed on the basis of the total number of attitudebehavior observations in that condition. These correlations were then transformed into Fisher's z scores and analyzed in a 2(reasons vs. control) X 2(immediate vs. delay) ANOVA. The analysis of Fisher z scores follows the process outlined in Games (1978) and used in numerous investigations of attitude-behavior correlation (e.g., Berger 1992; Snyder and Kendzierski 1982; Wilson, Kraft and Dunn 1989) In this analysis of variance, the standard error of a transformed z score is given by 1/(n-3)
, where n is the number of attitude-behavior pairs used to compute the correlation. When n is equal for each of the correlation coefficients being contrasted, 1/(n-3)
gives the known within-cells variance that the analysis of variance may be based on. Thus, the ANOVA is computed using the four condition-level Fisher z-scores that represent the attitudebehavior link for each of the conditions and the within-cells variance. Due to missing values, 6 of the original 209 participants were not included in this analysis.
After transforming these correlations to Fisher z scores, an ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of the elapsed time between attitude measurement and behavior (F(1,∞)=2.98, p<.05). More importantly, in support of H1, which predicted a significant interactive effect of the reasons task and timing of the behavior measure on the attitude-behavior link, the 2-way interaction was also significant (F(1,∞)=8. Figure 1 .
As further support for our findings, the attitude-behavior correlations were also computed and analyzed by using brand as the unit of analysis, thus accounting for systematic effects due to brand (see Berger 1992; Fazio et al. 1989 for similar analyses). For this analysis, attitudebehavior correlations were computed within each brand for each of the four different conditions resulting from our 2 (Reasons/control) × 2 (Immediate/delayed) design. After converting each of these sixteen correlations (four brands and four conditions) to a Fisher-z score, a 2 × 2 ANOVA was computed with brand as the unit of analysis. As expected, the two way interaction was significant (F(1, 12) = 30.87, p < .0001). Planned contrasts revealed that within the immediate conditions, analyzing reasons led to a significant increase in the attitude-behavior correlation (Reasons r =0.49, Non-reasons r = 0.36, F(1,12) = 5.81, p <.05), whereas a significant reduction was observed within the delayed condition (Reasons r =0.17, Non-reasons r =0.47, F(1,12)=29.7, p<.001).
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Supplementary Analyses
Process evidence in support of the above findings comes from an internal analysis within the conditions in which participants analyzed and reported reasons for brand preferences. For these conditions, each separate reason reported by participants was coded in terms of whether it implied a positive (e.g. "It targets young people, and I'm young, so I'll probably like it"), negative (e.g. "Because it was first formulated in the 1920's I feel nervous about it"), or neutral (e.g. "All candy is basically the same") evaluation of the brand. Two coders performed this task, and had an 86% agreement rate. Any disagreements were discussed until a common code was agreed upon.
For each participant, a valenced reasons index (VRI) for each brand was formed by subtracting the total number of negative reasons from the total number of positive reasons (note that VRI could not be computed for participants in the control condition). In the delayed condition, where analyzing reasons leads to disruption, we would expect that this index of liking based on reasons should be highly correlated with attitudes, but not with choice behavior. This prediction is based on the premise that analyzing reasons leads to a temporary shift in attitudes in the directions of the reasons, but does not carry over to subsequent behavior. This argument received good support: in the delayed condition, a significant correlation was observed between VRI and brand attitude (r = .612, p <.001), but not between VRI and choice (r = .048, p=.51). In the immediate condition, however, the index of reasons-based liking should be highly correlated with both attitudes and behavior. Such was found to be the case: VRI was significantly correlated with both attitude (r = .669, p <.001) and choice (r = .441, p<.001). Thus, analyses based on the reasons-based liking index offer convergent support for our predictions.
Discussion
Disruption in a Consumer Context. Study 1 produced two major findings regarding the impact of reasons analysis in a purchase context. First, given a delay between attitude and behavior, we found that analyzing reasons for brand preferences actually weakens the attitudebehavior link in comparison with a control group. This finding has interesting implications for survey research, wherein consumers are often asked to think about why they like a particular brand. Our disruption finding reveals that such a question may have counterproductive effects.
The relevance of this finding is heightened by the fact that, in a consumer context, there is usually a substantial delay between exposure to brand information, and final purchase. As our findings show, such a delay can facilitate disruption.
Our results provide another demonstration of the disruptive effect of analyzing reasons, but in a new context -that of attitude formation towards new products, and subsequent choice behavior. While the disruption effect is well-established, our demonstration of the effect in this new context provides an extension of the basic premise underlying the effect. In prior research, reasons analysis has been shown to yield disruption because the reasons task causes attitudes to become temporarily biased in the direction of the reasons that are brought to mind, while behavior (after a sufficient period of interaction with the object) is guided by the "true" or chronic evaluation of the object (Wilson et al. 1984; Wilson et al. 1993 ). In the current study, the new product scenario makes the existence of such a well-formed "true" evaluation less likely. Rather, we suggest that disruption occurs because reasons analysis caused initial attitudes to be unduly biased by easily verbalizable information, whereas purchase behavior (at delay) is more likely to be guided by the visual cues available in the purchase context.
While these two types of disruption are thus not identical, they do share the same basic premise: namely, disruption occurs when reasons analysis causes a mismatch between the basis of attitudes and the basis of behavior. In Wilson's research, the mismatch occurs because reasons-based attitudes are not guided by "true" evaluations, whereas the behavior is; in the current case, the specific cues available in the purchase context create an explicit mismatch between the underpinnings of reasons-based attitudes and choice behavior. This mismatch perspective is consistent with the constructive model of attitudes and behavior (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988) In recognition of the disruption effect literature, Petty and Cacioppo (1986, pg. 190 ) acknowledge that these "very interesting findings warrant further investigation." Our results identify a moderating variable which can reconcile the conflicting predictions, at least in the specific context under investigation. We find that while the disruption effect is likely to occur when there is a time lag between attitudes and behavior, reinforcement does take place when the attitude and behavior measures are proximal.
Interestingly, some prior research on the disruption effect also supports the idea that disruption can be averted when the behavior measure closely follows attitude measurement. Wilson et. al (1989a) point out that while reasons analysis typically does not affect behavior (although it does affect attitudes, thus causing disruption), this is not always the case. In particular, they argue that when behavior is measured soon after reasons analysis and attitude measurement, the cognitions highlighted by the reasons task (and the resultant attitude) should be salient enough to guide behavior, leading to attitude-behavior consistency. Empirical support for this rationale was obtained by a re-analysis of the attitude-behavior data obtained in the "puzzles" experiment described earlier (Wilson et al. 1984) . In this experiment, behavior was measured (subsequent to reasons analysis and attitude measurement) by giving participants a 15-minute free play period in which they could play with the puzzles of their choice. As mentioned earlier, disruption was observed when behavior was measured over this entire interaction period -participants who analyzed reasons for their puzzle preferences displayed a lower attitudebehavior link than a control group. However, Wilson et al. (1989a) argued that such disruption
should not be observed for participants' initial choice of puzzle to play with, since this choice should be guided largely by the attitudes and cognitions that still remained salient following the reasons task and attitude measurement. Such was indeed found to be the case -a high degree of attitude-behavior consistency was obtained in both the reasons and control condition when behavior was measured simply in terms of initial choice (please see Wilson et al. 1989a, pg. 305 for details; see also Wilson et al. 1993 for similar results).
These findings are consistent with the current research in showing that reasons analysis may also affect behavior, thus averting disruption, when behavior is proximal to attitude measurement. Apart from preventing disruption, the current findings go a step further in demonstrating actual reinforcement -reasons analysis in the immediate condition led to a higher attitude-behavior link than the control group. The fact that such reinforcement was not obtained in Wilson et al.'s (1984) study may be attributable to their focus on strong attitudes (which were based on direct experience). For such attitudes, the attitude-behavior link in the control group itself may be expected to be quite high, as was indeed the case (r = .54), thus creating a ceiling effect.
Finally, while the results from Study 1 provide one way of reconciling the disruption literature with predictions based on dual models research, it should be noted that our findings represent only an initial attempt at integrating these two important streams of research, and we would hesitate to generalize our findings to other contexts. Research on the dual process models typically uses very different stimuli and manipulations from those used in disruption studies. For example, elaboration is generally manipulated via personal relevance of the product. It seems plausible that while both personal relevance and reasons-analysis may produce greater elaboration than control conditions, the former manipulation may lead to more effortful processing than reasons-analysis. Such high levels of processing could very possibly in greater attitude strength (and a stronger attitude-behavior link), as suggested by both the HSM and the ELM.
Indeed, Wilson et al. (1989a) suggest that the disruption effect may be limited to cases where people do not spend too much effort thinking about reasons -if they were to engage in highly effortful processing of reasons, disruption may not occur even when behavior is measured after a delay.
DISRUPTION VS. REINFORCEMENT II: TIMING OF REASONS TASK
Study 1 demonstrated that while analyzing reasons increases the attitude-behavior link when there is no delay between the two measures, disruption of the link occurs under conditions of delay. This latter finding is of particular importance in the consumer domain, since most purchases do take place some time after initial exposure to brand information. An important question thus arises: are there conditions under which reasons-analysis can increase the strength of the link, even when purchase behavior is measured after a delay? Study 2 aims to answer this question. Further, just as Study 1 attempted to reconcile the disruption effect with opposing models of the attitude-behavior process, Study 2 also seeks to achieve a reconciliation between conflicting perspectives indicative of reinforcement as opposed to disruption effects.
As Wilson et al. (1989a, pg. 299) note, "perhaps the most controversial part (of the mechanism underlying the disruption effect) is the idea that when asked to explain their feelings, people will search for reasons that do not match their initial affect" (words in parentheses ours).
An opposing perspective is offered by consistency models such as balance theory (Heider 1958) and the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) Tetlock's Social Contingency Model of accountability (SCM: Tetlock, 1992) suggests that even when the attitude object(s) is(are) unfamiliar, consistency motivations (such as dissonance reduction) may operate, depending on the timing of the reasons task vis a vis the attitude measure. In the disruption experiments (as also in Study 1 of this paper), participants in the experimental condition typically analyze and report their reasons before they complete the attitude measures. However, the SCM indicates that when people are asked to justify their evaluations after having committed to a particular position (e.g. after completing an attitude measure), they are likely to devote a major portion of their mental effort to defending and bolstering that position. Post-evaluation cognitions in such a case will tend to be consistent with the evaluation itself. This should result in a strengthening of the initial attitude, in line with research predicting that stronger attitudes are obtained when people's thoughts are consistent with initial attitudes (Tesser, Martin and Mendolia 1995) . Thus, the act of analyzing reasons after having reported attitudes should strengthen attitudes as compared to a control group which does not analyze reasons. In this regard, the reasons task should have a similar effect as that induced by the recall of attitude-relevant behaviors following attitude formation (Ross et. al 1983; Zanna, Fazio and Ross 1994) . Such autobiographical recall tends to be of a biased nature, in that the recalled behaviors are consistent with the newly formed attitude (Ross, McFarland and Fletcher 1981) . Biased recall has been shown to bolster attitudes, leading to a greater link between the initial attitude and delayed measures of behavior (Ross et al. 1983 ; experiment 2).
Analogously, we suggest that if participants engage in a reasons analysis task after forming and reporting their attitudes, the reasons will be biased in the direction of the attitudes, leading to a strengthening of initial attitudes. In turn, such attitude bolstering should be reflected in a stronger link with behavior, even when behavior is measured after a delay (Ross et. al 1983; Zanna, Fazio and Ross 1994) . Thus, simply switching the timing of the reasons task should serve to reverse the disruption effect, even when there is a time lag between the attitude and behavior measures. Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 2:
When consumers are asked to analyze reasons for their brand preferences prior to engaging in purchase behavior, the timing of the reasons task (vis a vis the attitude measure) will moderate the effect of the reasons task on the link between attitude and behavior.
Further, the specific nature of the interaction is predicted as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Analyzing reasons for brand preferences (versus not analyzing reasons)
should lead to a disruption of the link between brand attitudes and purchase behavior when reasons are analyzed prior to attitude measurement.
Hypothesis 2b: Analyzing reasons for brand preferences (versus not analyzing reasons)
should lead to a reinforcement of the link between brand attitudes and purchase behavior when reasons are analyzed after attitude measurement.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was a 2X2 between-subjects full factorial design. The factors were (i) the presence or absence of a product-related reasons task, and (ii) the timing of the reasons taskeither prior to attitude measurement or immediately after attitude measurement. 153 graduate management students participated in the study during a regular class session in return for an entry in a lottery for a $100 prize. The basic procedure, cover story, etc. utilized in Study 2 was identical to Study 1. As in Study 1, participants in the presence of a product-related reasons task (the "reasons" conditions) analyzed reasons about the stimuli (i.e., the candy bar brands) while those in the "control" condition analyzed reasons about their educational choices. All participants in Study 2 had a five day delay between attitude measurement and the behavioral measure (identical to the "delay" conditions in Study 1).
Participants assigned to conditions receiving the reasons task prior to attitude measurement ("reasons before attitudes" conditions) followed the order described in Study 1, namely: instructions, examination of stimuli, reasons task, attitude measurement, and finally the behavioral measure. Participants assigned to conditions which performed the reasons task after attitude measurement ("attitudes before reasons" conditions) followed the same order, but had reasons and attitude tasks reversed, as follows: instructions, examination of stimuli, attitude measurement, reasons task, behavioral measure.
Results
Of the 153 initial participants, 150 completed the experiment and are included in the analyses. Unlike in Study 1, the reasons manipulation had an effect on initial attitudes, with a higher attitude being reported in the control condition vs. the reasons condition (6.6 vs. 5.7; F(1,596) = 33.7, p<.001). As noted by Wilson et al. (1989a) , the reasons manipulation may or may not change average attitudes. This depends on whether the reasons task uniformly (i.e., across participants) highlights cues of the same valence (leading to a change in average attitudes), or whether different participants bring to mind oppositely valenced reasons (canceling each other out in aggregate and leading to no change). The disruption effect has been reliably obtained, however, irrespective of whether or not the reasons manipulation caused a change in average attitudes (for a breakdown of study results, see Wilson et al. 1989a, p. 295) .
Accordingly, as in Study 1, our analysis focused on the link between attitude and behavior.
Attitude-behavior correlations were computed between participants' reported attitude toward each of the brands and a binary choice variable. As in Study 1, these correlations were transformed to Fisher z scores upon which a 2(reasons vs. control) X 2(reasons before attitudes vs. attitudes before reasons) ANOVA was run.
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of the timing of the reasons task on the attitude-behavior relationship, such that analyzing reasons prior to reporting attitudes led to lower attitude-behavior relationships than analyzing reasons after reporting attitudes (F(1,∞)=9.56, p<.01), providing evidence that the timing of the reasons manipulation can significantly influence the link between reported attitudes and choice behavior. More importantly, the hypothesized twoway interaction between the effect of analyzing reasons and the timing of the reasons task was found to be significant (F(1,∞)=13.67, p<.01), providing support for H2, our contention that the timing of the reasons task is a moderating factor on the disruptive effect of analyzing reasons on the attitude-behavior link. Please see Figure 2 for a summary of these results.
---------------Insert Figure 2 about here---------------
As predicted by H2a, a planned contrast of participants in the "control/reasons before attitudes" condition (r=0.49) and participants in the "reasons/reasons before attitudes" condition (r=0.19) was found to be significant (z=2.97, p<.01). Note that this result essentially replicates the result obtained in Study 1, providing further support for the basic hypothesis that asking participants to analyze reasons will lead to a disruption of the attitude-behavior link. More interestingly, H2b predicted that when reasons were analyzed after reporting attitudes, the reasons-analysis task should reverse the disruption effect: analyzing reasons should increase the strength of the attitude-behavior link as compared to the control group. A planned contrast within the "attitude before reasons" condition provided strong support for this prediction: participants who analyzed reasons had a significantly higher attitude-behavior correlation (r=0.66) than those who did not (r=0.48, z=2.25, p<.05). Thus, reversing the order of the reasons and attitude tasks reversed the disruption effect, as we had predicted.
The attitude-behavior correlations were also computed and analyzed by using brand as the unit of analysis, thus accounting for systematic effects due to brand. Correlations were computed by brand as in Berger (1992) , and the 16 resulting correlations served as the input for a 2 (reasons vs. control) X 2(timing of reasons task -before vs. after attitude measurement) analysis of variance. As expected, results from the 2 × 2 ANOVA (F(3,12)=3.21, p=.06) yielded a significant two way interaction (F(1, 12) = 4.79, p < .05). Planned contrasts revealed that within the "reasons before attitude" conditions, analyzing reasons led to a significant decrease in the attitude-behavior correlation (Reasons r=0.32, Non-reasons r=0.56 , F(1,12)=4.52, p=.05), whereas a significant increase was observed within the "attitude before reasons" conditions (Reasons r=0.71, Non-reasons r=0.47, F(1,12)=5.43, p<.05).
Supplementary Analyses
Convergent support for our attitude-behavior findings was provided by an internal analysis within the conditions where participants analyzed and reported reasons for brand preferences. As in Study 1, for each participant, we computed a valenced reasons index (VRI) for each brand by subtracting the total number of negative reasons from the total number of positive reasons. In the "reasons before attitude" conditions, where analyzing reasons leads to disruption, we would expect that this reasons-based liking index should be highly correlated with attitudes, but not with choice behavior. This argument received good support: a significant correlation was observed between VRI and brand attitude (r = .586, p<.001), but not between VRI and choice (r = .062, p=.43). In the "attitude before reasons" condition, however, where analyzing reasons leads to reinforcement, the index of reasons-based liking should be highly correlated with both attitudes and behavior. Such was found to be the case: VRI was significantly correlated with both attitude (r =.601, p<.001) and choice (r = .432, p<.001). Thus, analyses based on the reasons-based liking index offer convergent support for our predictions.
Further insights into the underlying process can be provided by examining the evaluative consistency of the reasons generated. We predicted that analyzing reasons after forming and reporting brand attitudes should lead to greater evaluative consistency among these reasons, thus bolstering brand attitudes and increasing the strength of the attitude-behavior link (Tesser et al. 1995; Tetlock 1992) . In order to provide support for this prediction, we computed an index of evaluative consistency, defined as the ratio of the total number of either positively or negatively valenced reasons (whichever is greater) to the total number of reasons listed for each brand (Tetlock 1983 ). This index was compared for the two conditions in which participants analyzed reasons for brand preferences. The smaller the value of the index (i.e., the closer the index is to zero), the lower the evaluative consistency among the reasons generated. As expected, evaluative consistency was found to be higher in the "attitude before reasons" condition (EC = 0.75) than the "reasons before attitude" condition (EC = 0.67, F (1, 317) = 6.70, p < .01).
Discussion
As in Study 1, the results of Study 2 demonstrate the disruptive effect of analyzing reasons for brand preferences on the link between attitude and behavior, when reasons were analyzed before attitude measurement. More interestingly, we find support for a second moderating factor on the disruptive effect of analyzing reasons on the attitude-behavior link. The significant two-way interaction obtained in Study 2 shows that the timing of the reasons task plays a critical role in the disruptive effect of analyzing reasons. When asked to analyze reasons after reporting attitudes, no disruption effect was observed -in fact, a significant increase in the attitude-behavior correlation was found. Thus, even in the context of a delay between the measures of attitude and behavior, it seems possible to reverse the disruption effect by appropriate timing of the reasons task.
Apart from extending earlier work on the disruption effect, these results also add to Tetlock's (1992) social contingency model (SCM) of the effects of accountability. This model suggests that analyzing reasons after attitudes have been reported causes people to justify and strengthen their attitudes. As far as we are aware, our study represents the first instance in which this strength-related prediction of the SCM has been tested in the context of the attitude-behavior link. Our results provide good support for the model: analyzing reasons after attitude measurement does seem to increase attitude strength, as evidenced in a stronger link with behavior. Thus, via its effect on attitude strength, reasons analysis in this condition actually exerts an impact on behavior. This can be contrasted with disruption findings in the "reasons before attitude" condition, wherein reasons analysis does not have any influence on behavior.
Study 3 seeks to replicate and extend the findings obtained in Study 2 to a new contextthat of attitude persistence. There are two major reasons to focus on attitude persistence as the dependent variable of interest (in addition to the attitude-behavior link studies thus far). First, research in the area of attitude strength has repeatedly made the point that strength is a multidimensional construct, and should preferably be measured by multiple indicators (e.g, Petty and Krosnick 1995). While the attitude-behavior link is one such indicator, another commonly studied outcome is attitude persistence -the greater the strength of the initial attitude, the longer it should persist over time. We have made the case that analyzing reasons after attitude measurement increases the strength of the attitude. Accordingly, a higher degree of persistence should be observed in this condition, as compared to a control.
Second, a study of attitude persistence helps to further clarify the underlying mechanism for the disruption effect that has been demonstrated in the first two studies of this paper. We have reasoned that a breakdown of the attitude-behavior correlation is observed because reasons analysis (before attitude measurement) causes the attitude measured at Time 1 to be based on a set of cues different from those that are available to guide the decision at Time 2. If this is indeed the case, such a breakdown of the link between the initial and delayed decisions should be observed even if the decision at Time 2 consists of an attitudinal judgment, rather than a behavioral choice. In other words, our demonstration of the disruption effect should not be unique to the attitude-behavior link -it should also translate to lower attitude persistence.
Otherwise, it might be argued that disruption occurs not because of a mismatch between the cues guiding initial attitudes and delayed behavior, but simply because behavior is a more robust construct than attitudes (Campbell 1963 ) and is thus not affected by reasons analysis. This alternate explanation for our disruption findings may be refuted by demonstrating the effect in the context of attitude persistence. Specifically, just as analyzing reasons (prior to attitude measurement) lowers attitude-behavior correspondence it should also lead to lower persistence of the initial attitude, as compared to a control group.
Study 3 was therefore run to replicate Study 2 findings in the context of attitude persistence. Further, as described below, Study 3 also contained additional checks, as well as a control group which enabled us to rule out an alternate explanation for the increased attitudebehavior link obtained when reasons are analyzed after attitudes.
STUDY 3: REASONS ANALYSIS AND ATTITUDE PERSISTENCE
Study 3 was similar in design to Study 2, with some differences that are discussed below.
As in Study 2, the basic design was a 2X2 between-subjects full factorial design. The factors were (i) the presence or absence of a product-related reasons task, and (ii) the timing of the reasons task -either prior to attitude measurement or immediately after attitude measurement.
122 undergraduate management students participated in the study in partial fulfillment of a class requirement. The basic procedure, cover story, etc. utilized in Study 3 was similar to Study 2.
Participants in the presence of a product-related reasons task (the "reasons" conditions)
analyzed reasons about the stimuli (i.e., the candy bar brands) while those in the "control"
condition analyzed reasons about their educational choices. Depending on the condition, attitude measurement (on the same scales as in the previous studies) either immediately preceded, or immediately followed, reasons analysis. Subsequently, all participants completed two items measuring the amount of processing. These measures were unique to this study, and were taken in order to check the assumption that reasons analysis corresponds to more effortful processing. The two scales asked participants' to indicate how much effort (1="very little" and 7="very much") they had spent in: a) thinking about the candy bar information before making their evaluations of the candy bars and b) in thinking about their evaluations of the different candy bars. We expected participants in the "reasons-before-attitude" condition to get higher scores on the first scale, as compared to the control non-reasons group. Participants in the "attitudebefore-reasons" condition, on the other hand, should report high scores on the second scale, as compared to their equivalent non-reasons group.
As in Study 2, all participants experienced a five day delay between initial attitude measurement and the collection of the final dependent measure. In Study 3, however, instead of making a choice at the second session, participants completed a second set of attitude measures. They responded to two items per candy bar, each on a 1-7 scale, with endpoints "Good"/"Bad" and "Like"/"Dislike. The endpoints were deliberately chosen to be different from those employed in the first session (-4 to +4) in order to minimize simple recall of a previously reported rating on a particular attitude scale (Powell and Fazio 1984) .
Thus, all participants responded to initial as well as delayed attitude measures. The major goal of Study 3 was to examine the relationship between attitude measured in the first session (Attitude1) and attitude measured at the second session five days later (Attitude2). Consistent with Study 2 findings, we expected that analyzing reasons before attitude measurement would lower attitude persistence as compared to the equivalent (non-reasons) control, whereas reasons analysis subsequent to attitude measurement would increase persistence vis a vis the equivalent non-reasons control condition.
Finally, in addition to the four experimental cells in the 2×2 design, another condition (the "attitude-reasons-attitude" condition) was run in which an additional attitude measure (two items, scaled -4 to +4, with endpoints "weak/strong" and "negative/positive") was collected at the end of the first session immediately following the reasons task (Attitude1b). Thus, this group followed the following sequence: instructions, examination of stimuli, initial attitude measurement, reasons task, a second initial session attitude measure, involvement measures, a five day time lag, and finally the delayed attitude measure. This condition was included in order to check whether reasons analysis after attitude measurement increases attitude extremity. We have theorized that reasons analysis increases the attitude-behavior link (and attitude persistence) by increasing the strength of the attitude -not by increasing its extremity. Prior research, however, has found that highly extreme (i.e., highly positive or highly negative) attitudes are likely to correlate strongly with later behavior (Berger and Mitchell 1989; Powell and Fazio 1984) . Thus, if reasons analysis after attitude measurement increased the extremity of the initial attitude, this would constitute an alternate explanation for the heightened attitude-behavior link obtained in Study 2. Including the second measure of attitude immediately following reasons measurement allowed us to check this explanation.
Results
Analyses are first reported for the 96 participants belonging to the four cells of the basic 2 × 2 design. In all four cells, correlations were computed between participants' initial attitudes (Attitude1) and delayed attitudes (Attitude2) towards each brand. A 2(reasons vs. control) X 2(reasons before attitudes vs. attitudes before reasons) ANOVA was carried out on these correlations, after a Fisher-z transformation.
Paralleling our previous attitude-behavior findings, a significant main effect of the timing of the reasons task on the attitude1-attitude2 relationship was observed, such that analyzing reasons prior to reporting attitudes led to a lower correlation than analyzing reasons after reporting attitudes (F(1,∞)=33.36, p<.001). More importantly, the hypothesized two-way interaction between the effect of analyzing reasons and the timing of the reasons task was found to be significant (F(1,∞)=50.52, p<.001). As predicted, a planned contrast of the "control/reasons before attitudes" condition (attitude1-attitude2 r=0.722) and the "reasons/reasons before attitudes" condition (r=0.127) was significant (z=5.27, p<.01), showing that reasons analysis prior to attitude measurement substantially lowered attitude persistence. On the other hand, a planned contrast within the "attitude before reasons" conditions showed that participants who analyzed reasons had a significantly higher attitude1-attitude2 correlation (r=0.912) than those who did not (r=0.698, z=4.62, p<.01). Thus, reasons analysis after attitude measurement (vs. not analyzing reasons) actually leads to an increase in attitude persistence.
Attitude persistence was also analyzed by comparing the absolute difference of standardized attitude scores for each brand during the first session and the standardized attitudes collected during the second session. Standardization was required as the scales used to measure attitude at the two different points in the experiment were different (Wilson et al. 1989b Figure 3 . Planned contrasts were used to further explore these effects. When reasons were analyzed prior to attitude measurement, a higher absolute difference was obtained when product-related reasons were asked (mean difference = 1.06) versus when they were not asked (md=0.57; F(1,379)=30.81, p<.001) -note that a higher difference score indicates less persistent attitudes. When reasons were collected after attitude measurement, exactly the opposite pattern was observed. A lower difference (and thus, higher persistence) resulted for those analyzing product-relevant reasons (md=0.31) as compared to those who did not give such reasons (md=0.52; F(1,379)=3.89, p<.05). Thus, both sets of analyses (with correlations as well as difference scores) are highly supportive of our predictions. Analyzing reasons before attitude measurement leads to disruption (lower persistence), whereas analyzing reasons after attitude measurement leads to reinforcement (higher persistence).
Finally, an examination of the fifth condition -the "attitude-reasons-attitude" groupshowed that reasons analysis after attitude measurement does not increase attitude extremity.
The correlation of attitudes measured prior to the reasons task (Attitude1) with attitudes measured immediately following the reasons task (Attitude1b) was quite high (r=0.874, p<.001).
Importantly, a more direct measure of the increase in extremity was found to be quite low. At the brand level, this measure was coded as the difference between Attitude1b and Attitude1 ratings (both measures were on a -4 to +4 scale) if the brand was rated positively (>0) on the Attitude1 measure and as Attitude1-Attitude1b if the brand was initially negatively rated (<0). Thus, higher scores would be obtained on this index if attitudes increased in extremity following the reasons task, either by positive brands becoming more positive or by negative brands becoming more negative. However, the value of this index was not significantly greater than zero (mean extremity= -0.04, t(67)=-0.39, p=0.70). Further, attitude persistence in this condition was, as might be expected, very similar to that of the "attitude before reasons/ product-related reasons collected" condition in the main experiment (correlations of 0.86 and 0.91, respectively). Thus, while our studies show that analyzing reasons after attitude measurement leads to greater attitude persistence as well as a stronger attitude-behavior link, these results cannot be attributed simply to an increase in attitude extremity following reasons analysis.
Supplementary Analyses
As we did in the previous studies, for each participant, we computed a valenced reasons index (VRI) for each brand by subtracting the total number of negative reasons from the total number of positive reasons. In the "reasons before attitude" conditions, where analyzing reasons leads to less persistent attitudes, we would expect that this index of liking based on reasons should be highly correlated with attitudes collected in the first session, but not with attitudes collected after the five day time lag. As expected, a significant correlation was observed between VRI and brand attitude during session 1 (r = .706, p<.001), but not between VRI and attitudes collected during the second session (r = .070, p=.49). In the "attitude before reasons" condition, however, where analyzing reasons leads to reinforcement of attitudes, we expected, and found, a significant correlation of VRI with both attitude1 (r =.658, p<.001) and attitude2 measures (r = .701, p<.001). Thus, as in our earlier studies, analyses based on the reasons-based liking index offer convergent support for our predictions.
As in Study 2, we also examined the evaluative consistency of the reasons generated.
We predicted that analyzing reasons after forming and reporting brand attitudes should lead to greater evaluative consistency among these reasons, thus bolstering brand attitudes and increasing the persistence of these attitudes. As expected, and mirroring our Study 2 results, evaluative consistency was found to be higher in the "attitude before reasons" condition (EC = 0.84) than in the "reasons before attitude" condition (EC = 0.75, F (1, 189) = 4.48, p < .05).
Finally, analyses were also carried out on the two self-report measures of effort. On the first scale, which measured the amount of information processing before making evaluations, participants in the "reasons-before-attitude" condition reported significantly higher scores (mean= 5.65) than the equivalent non-reasons group (mean = 4.05; F(1, 94)=14.8, p<.001). Thus, as expected, more effortful processing of product information was undertaken for the former group compared to the latter. Also as might be expected, scores on this scale did not differ for the two "attitude before reasons" cells (reasons = 4.05; control = 4.11; F(1,94)=0.03, ns). By contrast, scores on the second involvement scale, which measured the extent to which participants thought about their evaluations, did differ for these two groups (reasons=5.00, control = 3.59;
F(1, 94)=7.02, p<.01) but did not differ for the "reasons before attitude" cells (reasons=3.26, control=3.23; F(1,94)=0.00, ns). Thus, as we had suggested earlier (see footnote 7), reasons analysis before attitude measurement does increase the processing of information used in forming evaluations, analogous to the effects of greater involvement (Petty et al. 1983 ). On the other hand, reasons analyses after attitude measurement increases the extent to which participants think about their evaluations, consistent with our prediction that such reasons analysis increases attitude strength.
Discussion
The attitude persistence results obtained in Study 3 provided a reassuring parallel with earlier findings relating to the attitude-behavior link, on two fronts. First, the basic disruption finding in the "reasons before attitude" condition that was documented both in Study 1 and Study 2, was also observed for the case of attitude persistence. Analyzing reasons before attitudes led to a significantly lower correlation with delayed attitudes, as compared to the control. This result refutes the criticism that the attitude-behavior disruption documented in earlier studies was a simple artifact of behavior being an intrinsically robust type of response, which is not affected by reasons analysis.
Second, as predicted by Tetlock's SCM model, analyzing reasons subsequent to attitude measurement does appear to bolster and strengthen the attitude. While Study 2 demonstrated this effect in the context of the attitude-behavior link, Study 3 found further evidence for increased strength by documenting greater persistence in the "attitude before reasons" condition as compared to the control. Our check on the amount of effort spent on thinking about evaluations also yielded supportive results. Participants in the "attitude before reasons" condition reported significantly higher scores on this index as compared to the control condition. In view of prior research that shows thinking about one's attitudes increases attitude strength (e.g. Fazio et al. 1982; Wilson and Dunn 1986) , this finding supports our contention regarding the bolstering effect of analyzing reasons after attitude measurement.
Finally, the results obtained in the "attitude-reasons-attitude" control group were also revealing. Results in this condition showed that analyzing reasons after attitude measurement did not lead to an increase in attitude extremity -attitudes measured immediately after the reasons task were not more extreme than those measured just before the task. Thus, the increased persistence obtained in the "attitude before reasons" condition is more likely a result of increased strength, rather than any increase in the extremity of the initial attitude.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results from all three experiments provide a convincing demonstration of the disruptive effect of asking consumers to analyze reasons in a new product context. The first two experiments showed that when reasons analysis precedes attitude measurement, and there is a substantial delay between attitude and behavior measures, a large decrease in attitude-behavior correspondence is obtained as compared to a control condition. Attitude-behavior correspondence is essentially cut in half for participants exposed to the reasons task. The third experiment obtained a similar result for attitude persistence -reasons analysis, when it preceded attitude measurement, produced significantly lower persistence as compared to a control group.
From a practical perspective, our findings carry interesting implications in relation to context effects within a market research questionnaire. Earlier research (e.g., Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996; Morwitz et al. 1993) has found that asking a purchase intention question can increase the link between intentions and behavior. The current disruption findings find support for the other side of the coin: asking consumers to analyze reasons can, under some circumstances actually lower the attitude-behavior link, and also reduce attitude persistence. This finding is of importance to market researchers who often need to find out why consumers feel the way they do about certain products -particularly in the context of a new product launch. Disruption may result in such cases, especially for product categories in which most consumers make choices based on factors which are not easily verbalizable.
This relatively pessimistic picture does not, however, tell the whole story. Not only do the current studies provide insight as to when analyzing reasons will lead to a disruption of the attitude-behavior relationship, they also identify conditions which not only prevent disruption, but actually lead to reinforcement. Specifically, we find that asking reasons can significantly increase the attitude-behavior link in the absence of a delay between attitude and behavior measures.
Even when there is a delay, we show that the attitude-behavior link is reinforced if the reasons task is completed after attitudes have been reported. Analyzing reasons after attitude measurement also leads to a significant increase in attitude persistence as compared to a
control.
An important theoretical contribution of our findings has to do with reconciling the disruption effect literature with other models of the attitude-behavior process. As mentioned earlier, research relating to dual process models of persuasion (Chaiken et al. 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) , as well as the research on the effects of accountability (Tetlock 1992 ) and mere thought (Tesser et al. 1995) , seem to offer conflicting predictions to the disruption results demonstrated by Wilson and his colleagues. Specifically, these research streams imply a reinforcement effect, whereby tasks such as reasons analysis should actually lead to an increase in attitude persistence and attitude-behavior correspondence. Our investigation suggests that these seemingly opposing perspectives are not so much conflicting as complementary: either reinforcement or disruption may occur depending on the levels of moderating factors such as the timing of the behavior measure as well as the timing of reasons analysis.
It should be noted that our studies provided conditions particularly conducive to obtaining a disruption effect, in that the verbalizable product information given to participants was relatively non-diagnostic. Wilson et al. (1989a) argue that when highly diagnostic verbalizable information is presented even for an unfamiliar attitude object (e.g., you know that a person whom you are meeting for the first time is a convicted felon), people are likely to be aware of the reasons for their attitudes, and analyzing reasons would not change attitudes as compared with a control group. The reasons task is unlikely to have an effect on the attitude-behavior link in such a context. Thus, in the consumer scenario investigated here, disruption may be prevented if all participants were exposed to highly diagnostic attribute information about the candy bars (e.g., the candy bars differed significantly in taste). An earlier pilot test we ran found support for this prediction. Very briefly, we compared the effect of analyzing reasons when attribute information was relatively non-diagnostic (the stimuli used in the current experiments were used for this condition) versus diagnostic (the brand information included data on the candy bars' taste). Using a "reasons before attitude" manipulation and a delay between attitude and choice measurement, we replicated our Study 1 finding in the non-diagnostic condition: analyzing reasons led a disruption of the attitude-behavior link. However, as predicted above, analyzing reasons in the diagnostic condition did not lead to disruption. Future research should further examine the role of information diagnosticity in the context of reasons analysis.
Finally, the ideas presented in this paper might be useful to consumer researchers who use cognitive protocols to tap into participants' thought processes in the context of judgment or choice decisions. While enormously useful insights may be gained by careful examinations of these protocols, the current research suggests that the act of measurement may actually affect some of the constructs being measured. It would be of interest to examine whether factors such as the timing of the protocols (before or after attitude measurement) have differential effects on important outcomes such as the link between attitudes and behavior, or the extent to which attitudes persist over time. Lusk and Judd's (1988) finding that unknowledgeable people tend to have inconsistent beliefs, Wilson et al. (1989b) suggest that for unfamiliar objects, people may bring to mind reasons that are inconsistent with evaluations. We return later to this issue and outline a boundary condition which enables us to reconcile the predictions made by consistency theories with the disruption effect. 6 While not reported in the text due to reasons of space, another analysis we carried out involved the use of brand choice as a two-level (1/0) factor in a 2(reasons/no-reasons) × 2 (immediate/delayed) × 2 (brand chosen/not chosen) ANOVA for brand attitude. The rationale behind this analysis was as follows: the difference between brand attitude in the Brand Chosen condition and the Brand Not Chosen condition should be greater for conditions where a higher attitude-behavior link is predicted. Thus, for the immediate condition, the above attitude difference should be greater for participants who analyzed reasons; and at delay, the difference should be greater for the non-reasons participants. Based on this reasoning, we expected, and found, a 3-way interaction in our three factor design (F = 8.23, p < .01). Further, a 4 factor ANOVA with brand as a factor revealed that the four-way interaction was non-significant (F < 1), thus confirming that the predicted pattern of correlations was not influenced systematically by the brand factor. 7 An important assumption that we have made in comparing these different research streams is that the task of analyzing reasons leads to greater processing of the presented information. If true, this would imply better information recall in the reasons condition compared to the control (Anderson 1983; Srull and Wyer 1989) . Supportive evidence was obtained in a pretest which used two different measures of recall of the verbal information used in Study 1: one consisting of identifying true vs. false statements relating to this information, and the other consisting of matching each brand with the correct information. Two hours after exposure to the information, participants in the reasons condition performed better than the control condition on the item recall measure (Reasons=32.8, Non-reasons=30.99, F(1,220)=4.58, p<.05) and the list matching measure (Reasons=2.12, Non-reasons=1.65, F(1,226)=6.63, p<.05). This data thus provides strong support for the position that reasons analysis does lead to greater cognitive processing of brand information. 8 As in Study 1, we conducted another analysis using brand choice as a two-level (1/0) factor in a 2(reasons/no-reasons) × 2 (timing of reasons: before/after attitudes) × 2 (brand chosen/not chosen) ANOVA for brand attitude. Following the logic outlined earlier, disruption in the "reasons before" condition and reinforcement in the "reasons after" condition should be manifested in a three way interaction. As expected, the three-way interaction in our three factor design was found to be significant (F = 14.63, p < .01). Further, a 4 factor ANOVA with brand as a factor revealed that the four-way interaction was non-
